Democrazy (Part 3)

In part one of this series I discussed how the problem of the tyranny of the masses is mitigated by providing a parliamentary structure and allowing direct democracy only at certain intervals. In part two I discussed the downside to this, governments that do not listen to the people but indulge in their own ideologies.

In this post, I just want to look at the balance between these two opposing problems. The fulcrum of that balance is the electoral cycle. In New Zealand that is every three years. In the US it is every four years for presidents, every two for house seats and six for senate seats, in Canada and the UK every five years. Somewhere between every two and every six years is a length of time that allows governments to do the unpopular things it needs to do without constantly resorting to popular politics and also allows the people to have their say often enough to prevent governments practicing tyranny over the population. It is no surprise that most democracies pitch that between three and five years.

There is good evidence that these electoral cycles produce specific behaviour [PDF] before and after elections. The paper cited demonstrates that taxes are almost invariably cut just before elections (Dr. Cullen, with his surpluses in 2002 and 2005, was a strange anomaly – especially since the 2005 election was close). All the hard fiscal adjustments (spending cuts and increasing taxes) occur after elections (not much of a surprise there). But what is a surprise is that those hard fiscal adjustments are commonly only made in presidential systems of government, non-presidential systems seem to ease into it more slowly.

What is perhaps more relevant to New Zealand is that the research indicates that majoritarian (winner takes all) forms of government indulge in pre-election spending cuts, while proportional forms of government such as MMP, are associated with expansions of the welfare state. Presumably the process of agreement between multiple parties leads to concessions of largesse to the minor parties, leading to more gifts to their followers. Peter Dunne’s Families Commission is a perfect example of this.

Now you know why the current government, the first National government to properly “get” MMP, is soft-pedalling on the restriction of welfarism. MMP ensures that the welfare state will endure.

Some might consider that reason enough to return to FPP.

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